The annual occasion of the UN climate talks usually provokes a lot of hand wringing from politicians, institutions and the media about the state of the worlds' environment. Platitudes are followed by hollowed promises. Delegates return home from their jaunt usually having been heavily
lobbied by fossil fuel representatives and little is actually agreed. As a result the ecological crises intensify, the world sees more floods, droughts, wildfires and these are more powerful.
It is this latter point that is the most important. The actuality of climate change manifests itself in very real ways, on people, companies and businesses and governments (local and national). The impact itself is uneven. Very roughly, countries in the global south, because of historic and contemporary realities - colonialism, imperialism, capitalism's uneven development are disproportionatly hit. The figures are stark: billions face a dangerous and unpredictable future.
How will these realities affect global politics? This is the complex task that authors Alexander F. Gazmararian and Helen V. Milner set out to examine in their new book Climate Fault Lines. Both are academics working in politics and international affairs, but their book differs from those I would normally read on environment and climate politics. It is a complex and important study of how institutions, politicians and individuals respond to climate change. Its conclusions are stark. It offers no easy solutions. But it deserves to be considered seriously.
Firstly let's have a look at what the authors argue. Despite the common belief that "we are all in it together", the authors highlight the "profoundly unequal toll" from climate change, a "variation in vulnerability" they label "climate change's economic geography". They define a "climate fault line", the 35th parallel, "a fuzzy boundary that marks the broad divide between regions projecto to suffer significant damage from rising temperatures and those likely to face more limited harm and, in some cases, potential net benefits". The line roughly divides the Global South from the Global North, but it bisects some countries - such as the United States and China.
Because this is a serious work of theory and science, it is worth quoting from the authors' methods and approach:
Our theory seeks to explain how people, businesses and governments respond to climate change. We focus on their beliefs, preferences, and political activities toward global warming. Our inquiry is positive, not normative. We seek to understand how these actors behave, not prescribe how they should act. The goal is to improve out understanding of why global warming is difficult to address...
...We assume that people, businesses and governments are self-interested when deciding how to respond to global warming. They first consider how global warming affects them rather than acting in the world's best interest. Self-interest doesn't always guide short-term behaviour; but, in the longer run, economic incentives influence political actors' strategies.
I should explain that the authors support their conclusions through analysis of surveys, reports and statistical data. I am no data scientist and more qualified readers than me can disect the methodology, but it seems to me to be rigorous. Troublingly what the authors conclude goes against the grain of perceived thought. Take the case of the study of how individual people change their attitude to climate change when they experience a "climate shock" - a disaster, be it flood, drought etc.
After a climate shock, only people in damage zones become more supportive of mitigation policy [to reduce emissions or otherwise deal with global warming].... There is no effect on climate shocks on policy preferences among people living in less-climate vulnerable areas.
They emphasise, "central to our theory, we find that only people in climate-vulnerable places respond to the shocks". The authors add, a little later, when discussing the impact of climate shocks on "climate skeptics" that:
The finding also suggests that more repeated and stronger exposure to extreme weather and disasters may be necessary to chaneg the minds of people most doubtful about global warming. What's clear, however, is that political attitudes aren't immutable - even among people who initially doubted the existence of global warming.
These conclusions, which demonstrate that those above the fault line do not fundamentally change their attitudes to global warming even after a climate crisis, are matched by similar findings for the other sections of society studied by the authors. For instance
after climate shocks, companies in damage zones spend more on climate lobbying. But for less vulnerable companies, there is no change in lobbying expenditures.... companies below the fault lime appear to learn from climate shocks and then select their political strategies based on how climate change will materially affect them in the future.
Similarly,
only local governments below the fault line respond to extreme heat by disclosing emissions mitigation actions. Importantly, only cities in the most democratic contexts become more likely to disclose mitigation politics after climate shocks. In less democratic contexts, extreme heat makes cities, especially those outside damage zones, less likely to take climate actions.
The authors are good at showing how different cases affect outcome - democratic accountability for instance, or the tensions that will arise within states (eg the US) where some regions are below and others above the fault line. They conclude, "local leaders who fear accountablity and anticipate future damages because of their geographic vulnerability become more likely to disclose emissions reduction actions."
There is a similar, and glaring, conclusion for national governments. Those countries that sit above the climate fault line are less likely to introduce policy to mitigate climate change in the aftermath of disaster. This challenges perceived wisdom. The liberal dominated governments of the developed world, particularly those in Europe and Canada, are considered "climate leaders". It is the countries that are most at threat that are most likely to respond to disaster with positive action on climate change: "national governments [that] perceive greater benefits from mitigation because of their vulnerability... pass more mitigation policies".
Readers who have got this far, or, more likely, finish Gazmararian's and Milner's book are entitled to ask "Why do we get these different responses?" Why in the face of scientific knowledge do governments and individuals, above and below the fault lines, act different? The authors suggest that understanding this requires accounting for "unequal ways that global warming will materially affect places worldwide". They worry that their study's conclusions show that we will "not succeed" in preventing disastorous climate change.
But reducing responses to climate shocks to differing impacts puts the cart before the horse. There are other factors that determine how people, institutions and governments think about climate change. The most important of these is hinted at when the authors acknowledge how more democratic states/governments are more likely to respond positively. This is the question of political campaigning, social movements and protest.
Moving from the theory of Climate Fault Lines to anecdotal evidence will help me illustrate this. Through 2019 there were growing, social movements around climate change. In Britain Extinction Rebellion put tens of thousands of people on the streets, drawing in new layers far beyond existing climate activists. At the same time Greta Thunberg began her school strikes. The response to this was massive, with walkouts in many countries.
In the UK where I am based, the school strikes began to morph into wider action. In September 2019 the movement saw serious, if small, mobilisations of trade unions and workers into solidarity with the students. In schools, colleges and workplaces, as well as the media, discussion global warming mushroomed. Suddenly every institution, government, and workplace wanted to declare a climate emergency and act. It can be argued that this was small beer. But it did lead to enough changes that the right today is desperate to roll back these successes. However we can conclude that social movements do shift companies and individuals, as well as governments - above and below the fault line.
Secondly, understanding how groups respond, must surely also require the study of the global economy itself. How does the penetration of government by fossil fuel companies hold back mitigation. The authors' case study of Norway notes that drought in there failed to lead to climate mitigation, while similar droughts in countries below the fault line did. Norway is a fossil fuel producer. What role did those companies play in holding back action? The industry certainly reduces the impact of COP conferences each year. Indeed the authors' case study of Nigeria seems to prove this point. Devastating floods in 2022 led to bold promises from the Nigerian government to act, yet "implementation has been slow and disappointing for some analysts". The barrier to this may well be the powerful oil companies in Nigeria, as well as the fact that "150,000 to 200,000 people work in the oil and gas industry and could lose their jobs in the transition".
While the Nigerian government is right to point out it needs international aid from countries above the fault line, we also have to probe deeper to understand how resistance from fossil fuel corporations and other stakeholders in the fossil fuel economy holds action back. Thus we are faced not just with the question of geography, but a geography that is superimposed on a global system of accumulation. Which, ultimately, is why social movements become central.
Climate Fault Lines is a challenging book because it points out how difficult dealing with climate change is, and will be. It shows us some painful truths. But I worried that the pessimistic conclusions reached by the authors arose not out of the statistical findings, but because those studies have become abstracted from wider contexts, and it is these contexts that will help us shape the political and social strategies we need to challenge fossil fuel capitalism and its inaction.
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