Douglas Newton - The Darkest Days: The truth behind Britain's rush to war, 1914

Why did Britain go to war in 1914? There are some old lies that explain this: "poor little Belgium", German troops "murdering babies" and that old canard, "for the defence of democracy". There are some more complex lies - that Britain was pulled into the war because of treaties and obligations to France and Russia, which place the war as an outgrowth of the complex game of thrones that Europe was in the early 20th century. However, Douglas Newton's brilliant book argues something very different. Britain went to war in 1914 because a small group of right-wing politicians, egged on and encouraged by a fanatically anti-German right-wing media pushed the boundaries at every stage making war more and more likely with every hour that passed.

Newton's book argues that Britain's involvement in the war was not inevitable. Indeed Europe wide, and eventual global war, was not inevitable either. But once Britain entered the conflict World War became a reality. Not least because the very first thing the British military did was to move to seize German colonial assets. 

The book covers a relatively short space of time. Remembering that old quip by Lenin, that there are "weeks when decades happen", the few days before in early August 1914 saw a mass of meetings, telegrams, arguments and diplomacy. It also saw a lot of anti-war organising, protest, resignations from the cabinet and a British government on the brink of collapse. The latter is usually neglected by historians.

War, according to Newton, was not inevitable primarily because there were significant sections of the British population - from the working classes to the liberal cabinet - that did not want war. Newton's focus is very much the machinations of the cabinet and leading politicians. In the cabinet, four ministers  John Burns, John Morley, John Simon and Lord Beaumont offerd their resignations at varous stages as the crisis progressed. These were principled men, whose opposition to the war was based on politics as well as morals and religion. However they were men who were wedded to the parliamentary system and national interests. Despite their resignations PM Herbert Asquith kept this crucial news from the British people and from parliament. Unwilling to allow a chink to appear in the armour of the British government on the verge of war, the four rebels kept their mouths shut. Asquith worked hard to pressure them to keep quiet, and this allowed the government to portray themselves as united. 

The drive to war was however also engineered by those who wanted it. Winston Churchill in particular as First Lord of the Admiralty, played an inglorious (and undemocratic) role, escalated tensions by mobilising and concentrating the British navy, encouraging a feeling of crisis and putting further pressure on the German leadership. 

Perhaps the most shocking thing to those who have faith in parliamentary process is that the declaration of war was never put to the test of parliamentary debate. Asquith's cleverness in hiding the fractures in the cabinet meant that when he spoke to Parliament and implied an ultimatum was being presented to Germany, 

the Radicals did not challenge Asquith. Why? Perhaps they still believd in the promised major debate before any declaration of war. But most likely, the Radicals chose to tread cuatiously and wait for confirmation of the facts from Belgium. It is possible, too, that the suddend adjournment of the House, under a recent and controversial Speaker's ruling 'that was little understood', caught the Radicals off guard.

The Radicals, says Newton, "simply lost their courage and chose silence on Tuesday 4 August". But it was not even the whole cabinet that made the decision for war. Newton points out that decision was made by "a small clique bunkered down in the Cabinet room. A mere coffee table's worth of the Cabinet". Later Newton adds, the King and three members of the Pricy Council declared war: "Faithfully reflecting the pre-democratic order, four men had launched Britain's war. There was not one elected man among them."

It was a sordid process of duplicity and cowardice. But it was not inevitable. Not least because as the crisis rapidly spiriled all sorts of activists, including trade unions, mobilised to try and stop the war. If I was worried that Newton's book would solely focus on the machinations of the political class, I was disabused of this fear by the chapters looking at the protest meetings, anti-war rallies and the newspapers of those who opposed the war. Despite the shortness of time, impressive numbers mobilised, and had those in the cabinet made their resignations public, its possible that this movement would have grown phenomenally and Britain would have been unable to join the conflict. Millions of lives might have been saved. It is in this spirit that Douglas Newton concludes his wonderful book:

How should Britain's Great War be remembered after a century? In a 'national spirit'? Perhaps the idea that for Britain there was no alternative to war, no error in her handling of the crisis, and no deed left undone in pursuit of peace is an essential consolation. But it is fairy dust. There is really only one story worth telling about the Great War: it was a common European tragedy - a filthy, disgusting and hideous episode of industrialised killing. Not the first, and not the last. It was unredeemed by victory. The uplifting element of the story lies in the struggle to avert it.

This is a remarkable book that will be denounced for its revisionism. But as we live in a world where nations commit genocide and go unpunished; Presidents bomb enemies without debate among their elected representatives and arms spending spirals upwards, its a story worth learning.

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